Cartesian Rationalism by Drozdowicz Zbigniew

Author:Drozdowicz, Zbigniew
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Peter Lang AG
Published: 2015-06-04T00:00:00+00:00

48 “Thus this shape of cognition as simple episteme, i.e., of the state of direct reflection by consciousness of a certain ontological actuality, shall be referred to as the epistemic shape of knowledge. Going further, borrowing this term for subsequent references, we shall use the notion of epistemic correlation with respect to this two-way relationship between the externality and the opposition as well as agreement and reflection, which come into being between the ‘knowing’ consciousness of some thing, and the thing itself being ‘known about’.” M. J. Siemek, Idea transcendentalizmu u Fichtego i Kanta, Warszawa 1977, s. 18ff.

49 According to this author, “the entire classical set of problems of pre-Kantian epistemology can be seen from this point of view seen as relating to the shape within which the problem of knowledge comes about in a given epistemic field of theory. This would be a theory of knowledge at the epistemic level. Such a strict attribution of this set of problems to this level of theory can be recognised through the fact that the philosophical reflection transposes its object there (which is now constituted within epistemology by Knowledge as differentiated from Being” (ibidem).

50 Por. D. Clarke, Descartes’ philosophy of science and the scientific, in: The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, op. cit., p. 258ff.

51 “This passage raised a number of queries from readers, one of whom was Father Morin. Descartes replied to his concerns in 1638 and answered the objection that hypothetical essays should not be described as demonstrated: “there is a big difference between proving and explaining. To this I add that one can use the word ‘demonstrated’ to mean one or the other, at least if one understands it according to common usage and not according to the special meaning which philosophers give it”. This shows Descartes explicitly breaking with the scholastic tradition, for which the term “demonstrate” had special connotations of deducing a conclusion rigorously from first principles.” (ibidem. 264ff.).

52 Cf. R. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of Mind, in: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, op. cit., p. 18.

53 In Rule IV, he criticises the cognitive operations of dialecticians, i.e., the scholastics, who aim at explaining the basic simple nature of intellect. In view of Descartes, “they are useless here—or rather they may be counted as obstructions, since nothing can be added to the pure light of reason without in some way obscuring it” (ibidem, p. 8.) It should also be added that Descartes came back to this issue in Principles of Philosophy, where he clearly states that “the light of nature, or the faculty of knowledge God has given us, can never disclose to us any object that is not true, inasmuch as the natural light encompasses it, that is, inasmuch as it perceives it clearly and distinctly”. Cf. R. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, op. cit., p. 239.

54 In Rule VII, Descartes states that “the capacity of our intellect is often insufficient to embrace them all in a single intuition (…) In the same

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